

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-14 DPW-01 AID-20 OMB-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19

DRC-01 /183 W  
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R 110711Z DEC 73  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9808  
INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 20738/1

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR VS IR  
SUBJECT: ICCS: FIRST ICCS SESSION WITH IRAN IN CHAIR

REF: SAIGON 20367 (NOTAL)

1. ACCORDING COMMENTS BOTH IRDEL AMB SADRI AND INDODEL AMB IDRIS, ICCS PLENARY DECEMBEGW7, WHICH LASTED APPROXIMATELY THREE HOURS WENT OFF QUICKLY AND SMOTHLY. SESSION WAS ENTIRELY DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION PROCEDRES;AGREEMENT REACHED BY ICCS, WHICH SADRI REFERRED TO AS QUTE DELICATE UNDERSTANDING UNQTE, CONCERNS BOTH CURRENT(NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER) REQUESTS FOR ICCS INVESTIGATION, AS WELL AS BACKLOG (;RIOR TO NOVEMBER).

2. IDRIS SAID HE BELIEVE PLENARY HAD REMOVED ALL LEGALISTIC REASONS FOR VDCS INACTIVITY QON INVESTIGATIONS, BUT HE ANTICIPATES COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS MAY WELL HAVE OTHER STRATEGEMS TO DELAY OR IMPEDE INVESTIGATIONS, NEXT STEP, ACCORDING TO IDRIS, CONFIDENTIAL

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IS FOR MILITARY COMMITTEE TO MEET AS SCHEDULED ON DECEMBER 10 AND ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO ICCS TEAMS TO BEGIN INVESTIGATIONS. HE EXPECTS TO CONSULT WITH SADRI BEFORE COMMITTEE MEETING TO ASSURE THAT IRDEL AND INDODEL WILL ACT IN HARMONY, PARTICULARLY SHOULD THE

COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS ATTEMPT AGAIN TO HOLD UP INVESTIGATIONS.

3. SADRI HIMSELF CONSIDERS THAT REAL PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE PLENARY AND TAKES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CREDIT PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE VALUE OF QTE CONSULTATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION UNQUOTE. FYI FOLLOWING PLENARY ACTING POLDEL CHIEF STAWIARSKI MADE POINT OF DROPPING BY SADRI'S OFFICE TO PRAISE HIS MANAGEMENT OF THE SESSION, SAYING THAT NO ONE ELSE ON THE COMMISSION HAD SADRI'S EXPERIENCE IN HANDLING MEETINGS END FYI. EVEN SADRI, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DURABILITY OF FRIDAY'S ACHIEVEMENT AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT WAS AGREED.

4. SADRI TOLD EMBOFF THAT ICCS PLENARY AGREEMENT INCLUDES FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) R REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIONS ORIGINATING IN SEPTEMBER SHOULD BE DROPPED (IDRIS SAID THAT THE E REQUESTS WILL BE DISCUSSED FURTHER BY POLITICAL COMMITTEE BUT IN ALL LIKELIHOOD ICCS WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO TAKE ACTION ON EITHER SEPT OR AUGUST REQUESTS)

(B) REQUESTS ORIGINATING IN OCTOBER WILL BE HANDLED ON A QTE SELECTIVE BALANCED UNQTE BASIS (THIS MEANS THAT APPROXIMATELY TEN REQUESTS FROM THE GVN WILL BE INVESTIGATED AND BALANCE OF SORTS TO BE MADE IN TERMS OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS INVOLVED SINCE SOME REQUEST FROM SIDES HAVE INCLUDED SEVERAL SEPARATE INCIDENTS)

AND

(C) INVESTIGATION OF ALL REQUESTS THEREAFTER STARTING NOVEMBER 1 ON A CHRONOLOGICAL BASIS.

5. IDRIS SAID THAT THE ELEMENT OF CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER REMAINS TO BE THRASHED OUT IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. HE SUSPECTS THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL ATTEMPT TO REQUIRE THE ICCS TO CARRY OUT INVESTIGATIONS IN STRICT CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, STARTING WITH THE OCTOBER REQUESTS, WHICH WILL DELAY IMMEDIATE ACTION ON THE MOST RECENT REQUESTS (NHA BE FOR EXAMPLE). INDODEL, HOWEVER WILL ATTEMPT TO CONFIDENTIAL

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GET THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS ON ALL REQUESTS SO THAT INVESTIGATIONS CAN BE PROMPTLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY CARRIED OUT THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT REGARD TO CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE. FAMILIAR WITH THE DELAY TACTICS OF HUNGDEL AND POLDEL IN THE BIEN HOA INCIDENT, IDRIS SAID QHE EXPECTS INDODEL HARSOYO AND

IRDEL GENERAL SODAIFY IBO MAKE SURE THAT THEIR TEAMS WILL PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO CARRY OUT INVESTIGATIONS WHEN INSTRUCTED TO DO SO, AND THAT IN EVENT HUNGDEL AND POLDEL TEAMS REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE, THEY BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THEIR OBJECTIONS IN WRITING SO THAT INVESTIGATION MAY BE COMPLETED AND REPORT FORWARDED AS WAS CASE WHEN CANDEL HERE.

6. SADRI REVEALED THAT HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH AMB KULAGA BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE TO WARSAW WERE BASIC TO AGREEMENTS REACHED IN PLENARY. ON DECEMBER 5 AND 6 SADRI HAD CONSULTATIONS WITH STAWIARSKI WHO WISHED TO EXTEND THROUGH NO CONCEPT OF QTE SELECTIVE BALANCED UNQTE HANDLING OF INVESTIGATION REQUESTS. STAWIARSKI'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT ICCS HAD TOO MANY NOVEMBER REQUEST TO CONSIDER THEM ALL. SADRI THEN SUGGESTED STAWIARSKI CABLE KULAGA IN WARSAW FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED PRIOR TO KULAGA'S DEPARTURE. SADRI SUBSEQUENTLY POINTED OUT TO STAWIARSKI THAT THE COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS' TACTIC ON TRYING TO TIE UP INVESTIGATIONS BY INSISTENCE ON CHRONOLOGY WAS PATENTLY AIMED AT GIVING PRG AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER QTE PUNITIVE ACTIONS UNQTE AGAINST THE GVN, THIS, SADRI SAID WAS QTE DOUBLE EDGED SWORD UNQTE AND A FOOLISH AND DANGEROUS POLICY.

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7. SADRI ACKNOWLEDGED PRIVATELY HE WOULD HAVE HAD GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN PUSHING THE SESSION THROUGH IN KULAGA HAD BEEN PRESENT.

QTE NO ONE GETS ANYTHING FROM THE COMMUNISTS FOR NOTHING AND I COMPROMISED ON THE PAST IN ORDER TO GAIN FOR THE FUTURE UNQTE.

8. YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AMBASSADOR SADRI CALLED ON AMBASSADOR MARTIN AND IN FAR RANGING DISCUSSION, CONFIRMED ESSENTIAL DETAILS RECORDED ABOVE. SADRI WAS PLEASE WITH HIS ACCOMPLISHMENT AS HE HAS EVERY RIGHT TO BE, IF IT WORKS. HE RECOGNIZES THE FRAGILITY OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE PLENARY SESSION BUT

BELIEVES HIS PATIENT INVESTMENT OF "HOURS OF LISTENING", HIS REFUSAL TO BE DRAWN INTO CONTROVERSIES ORIGINATING BEFORE ARRIVAL OF IRANIAN DELEGATION, AND OF ESTABLISHING SOME SMALL CREDIT WITH THE WEEKS OF HIS CONSISTENTLY EVENHANDED APPROACH MAY HAVE BROUGHT POLISH AND HUNGARIANS TO POINT OF GOING ALONG WITH PERMITTING INVESTIGATIONS TO BEGIN. IF SO, THE MOST STRIKING ACCOMPLISHMENT WILL BE THE DE FACTO WAIVING OF THE RULE OF UNANIMITY AT THE FIELD INVESTIGATING LEVEL. ACCORDING TO SADRI  
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THE REPORTS WILL NOW BE FORWARDED BY THE COMMISSION ROUTINELY TO THE TPJMC.

9. WHEN ASKED ABOUT PROGRESS ON BUDGET SADRI INDICATED HE WAS PUTTING ON ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE TO HAVE EACH DELEGATION FINISH WORK ON ITS OWN BUDGET FOR THE NEXT YEAR BEGINNING 1 APRIL 1974 WHICH WOULD THEN BE MELDED WITH SECRETARIAT BUDGET AND THE WHOLE WOULD THEN BE EXAMINED BY COMMISSION. THERE WERE SOME POINTS, RELATIVELY MINOR, WHICH HE THOUGH MIGHT BE SETTLED SOON. ASKED FOR EXAMPLES HE SAID INDONESIANS WANTED TO BE COMPENSATED FOR INTERIOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS COULD ONLY BE FROM CENTRAL POINT. HAVING DONE THIS HE WAS ABLE TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON POLES AND HUNGARIANS TO RECEDE FROM EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE POINTS.

10. SADRI INDICATED ONLY THIS WAY COULD WE PERHAPS, "BACK IN" TO SOME FINAL SETTLEMENT OF CURRENT BUDGET. HIS THEORY IS THAT CUPIDITY OF POLES AND HUNGARIANS MAY RESULT IN THEIR MOVING FROWARD ON NEW BUDGET WHICH WHEN ADOPTED BY COMMISSION, WILL POSE CERTAIN OBVIOUS PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS FOR HANOI SHOULD THEY MAINTAIN THEIR ADAMANT STAND. IF NEW BUDGET IS REASONABLE AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HE ASSUMED WE WOULD THEN GO ALL OUT IN SECURING DRVN AND PRG APPROVAL BOTH OF THE NEW BUDGET AND THEIR PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE CURRENT BUDGET.

11. ASKED ABOUT HIS CURRENT FEELING ON THE APPROPRIATE SIZE OF THE DELEGATION SADRI THOUGHT THEY ALL COULD BE REDUCED BY AT LEAST FIFTY FROM THE PRESENT FIGURE OF 290 PERHAPS MORE. HE SAID HE WAS PUT UNDER GREAT PRESSURE ON ARRIVAL TO JOIN POLES AND HUNGARIANS IN REFUSING TO MAN SUB REGIONAL SITES. SADRI SAID HE HAD CATEGORICALLY REJECTED SUCH PRESSURE SAYING SUCH A DECISION COULD ONLY COME FROM THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT, NOT FROM THE ICCS. HE TOLD THEM IRAN HAD UNDERTAKEN THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERSHIP ON THE COMMISSION WITH THE INTENTION OF FAITHFULLY OBSERVING THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, WITHOUT BEING PARTIAL TO EITHER SIDE. THEREFORE, DEPLOYMENT TO SITES SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT MUST BE CARRIED OUT. TO ARGUMENT THAT DEPLOYMENT TO UNSAFE SITES ENDANGERED ICCS PERSONNEL LIVES, SADRI SAID HE HAD REPLIED THAT SUCH DANGERS WERE IMPLICIT IN ACCEPTING MEMBERSHIP ON THE COMMISSION AND THAT WAS THE REASON FOR THE MILITARY CONTINGENTS. HE SAID HE TOLD THEM HE ASSUMED THE POLIES AND HUNGARIANS WERE AS BRAVE AS HIS OWN IRANIANS. NEVERTHELESS HE REITERATED HIS  
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CONVICTION THAT FULL DEPLOYMENT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT THE FULL COMPLEMENT OF 290.

12. HE SAID THE HUNGARIANS HAD BEEN HIGHLY AMUSED AT THE THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BUDAPEST WAS ACTUALLY APOLOGETIC FOR THE QUITE PROPER GVN INDIGNATION AT DELIBERATE BOORISHNESS OF HUNGARIAN ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY AT AMERICAN INSISTENCE ON MAINTAINING FULL COMPLEMENT OF 290 MOST WHOM WERE FULLY TRAINED INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHOSE PRODUCT, LARGELY PAID FOR BY AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS, WAS OBVIOUSLY OF SOME CONSIDERABLE BENEFIT TO HANOI.

13. SADRI SAID THERE WAS OF COURSE THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN. THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED TO RETURN BY WAY OF HANOI WHERE HE COULD TELL THEM THAT THERE WAS SIMPLY NO CHANCE OF A MILITARY SOLUTION IN THEIR FAVOR. SADRI SAID HE THOUGHT THE MESSAGE MIGHT BE SOMEWHAT DILUTED WHEN ACTUALLY DELIVERED BUT HE THOUGHT IT SIGNIFICANT THAT THIS APPRAISAL WAS CONVEYED TO HIM.

14. DECEMBER 7 SESSION COULD BE CRITICAL FOR FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS OF ICCS. SESSION IS PERHAPS ALSO CRITICAL IN SADRI'S OWN MIND. HE MAY WELL VIEW WHAT COMES NEXT AS A MEASURING STICK OF  
(1) THE VALIDITY OF HIS AGREEMENTS WITH COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS REACHED IN PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS AND  
(2) HIS ESTIMATE ON POSSIBLE LONG RANGE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRANIAN PARTICIPATION IN ICCS. FYI SADRI HAS TOLD EMBOFF HE WILL RETURN TO TEHRAN IN DECEMBER FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SHAH.

15. COMMENT: IF ONLY PART OF WHAT SADRI SAYS HE HAS IN TRAIN ACTUALLY COMES TO PASS WE WILL BE SOMEWHAT FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD THAN WE WOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED POSSIBLE. WE HAVE IN REALITY, LOST NOTHING BY THE "SELECTIVE BALANCED" CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST FOR OCTOBER, SINCE ICCS COULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN TO MOST OF THEM IN ANY EVENT. IF THE REQUESTS FROM BOTH SIDES FOR INVESTIGATIONS GO ROUTINELY FROM MILITARY COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS WHO WILL NOT BE BOUND BY RULE OF UNANIMITY THUS PERMITTING INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS TO SKIP THE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, THEN, JUST PERHAPS THE ICCS MAY BEGIN TO FUNCTION AT LAST. WE WILL WATCH AND SEE.  
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16. ON THE BUDGET WHAT SADRI HAS INITIATED AGAIN JUST MIGHT WORK. WE SHALL DISCREETLY ENCOURAGE ALL POSSIBLE SPEED. WE HAVE LONG FELT THAT AS LONG AS THE DEPLOYMENTS, AND OTHER ACTIONS SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENTS, ARE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT, THERE COULD BE SOME REDUCTION IN THE 290 COMPLEMENT FIGURE WITHOUT DAMAGE TO OUR INTERESTS. AND IT IS AN ANOMALY OF SORTS

THAT WE SHOULD BE FINANCING AN INTELLIGENCE OPERATION MOUNTED  
AGAINST OUR ALLY, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NEVER WHOLLY AVOIDABLE.

17. WE SUGGEST WE POSTPONE FURTHER PRESSURE FOR FULL IRANIAN  
MANNING UNTIL WE SEE WHAT THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WILL BRING  
AND WHAT REACTIONS ARE AVAILABLE FROM CONSULTATIONS WITH ICCS  
DEL CHIEFS IN WARSAW AND BUDAPEST.  
MARTIN

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## Message Attributes

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